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INTRODUCTION

On February 10, 1995, Stanley Cottman and an acquaintance delivered sixty-five cable boxes to a warehouse operation in
Kenilworth, New Jersey.' At the warehouse, they spoke with a
man who paid Cottman $8,650.2 Just over a week later, Cottman
brought another seventy-five cable boxes to the same warehouse, where his customer paid him $10,500.3 And again, on
February 21, 1995, Cottman and his partner sold another
eighty-six cable boxes to the same customer, who paid $13,280.4
All told, in the month of February, Cottman sold 231 cable boxes
for a total of $34,730. They were all stolen. And, to Cottman's
surprise, his customer was an undercover FBI agent.5
Undercover law enforcement agents occasionally use sting
operations to investigate individuals they suspect are committing crimes. Those operations often require the agents-like the
FBI agent in the case above-to act as buyers for illicit goods or
services. The money they use in those transactions-in this case
the $34,730 the FBI agent paid to Cottman-is called "buy money."6

The use of buy money is essential to sting operations and as
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1 United States v Cottman, 142 F3d 160, 162-63 (3d Cir 1998).
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Id at 163.
3 Id.
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Id.
5 Cottman, 142 F3d at 163.
6
See Jeffrey J. Noble and Geoffrey P. Alpert, Managing Accountability Systems
for Police Conduct: Internal Affairs and External Oversight 280 (Waveland 2008) ("Buy
money is used in drug and narcotic cases to purchase quantities of contraband and in
property cases to purchase stolen property."). Buy money is not exclusively used to purchase narcotics; it can be used to purchase a variety of contraband or illicit items. See,
for example, Cottman, 142 F3d at 168 (using the term "buy money" to refer to "the money [the FBI] paid [Cottman] to acquire the illegal cable boxes"). Police also use buy money in "reverse stings," in which they focus on the supply side of illegal activity and sell
illicit goods instead of buying them. For examples of reverse sting operations, see Ian
Duncan, FederalAuthorities Ensnare Criminals in 'Reverse Stings' (Baltimore Sun, July
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such has a lengthy history. Law enforcement pamphlets on how
to use buy money have been around since at least the late
1970s. 7 Usually, the suspects to whom undercover agents pay
buy money are arrested and convicted of the crimes in which
they were caught participating. During sentencing in those
cases, district-court judges sometimes require that defendants
repay the buy money they received as a condition of supervised
release.8 In United States v Cottman,9 for example, the district
court sentenced Cottman to ten months in prison and three
years of supervised release. As a condition of supervised release,
the court ordered that he pay back $32,420 of buy money."
The federal circuit courts disagree as to whether district
courts have this authority. The Third and Sixth Circuits have
held that the supervised release statute does not authorize or
require repayment of buy money." The Seventh Circuit has held
that it does.12 The result of this disagreement is that whether a
defendant incurs this type of serious legal financial obligation
(LFO) depends on the circuit in which she is prosecuted.
This Comment first considers the source of the circuits' disagreement. It explains that the circuits that prohibit buy-money
repayment (BMR) as a condition of supervised release do so because they believe it is restitution. The Seventh Circuit, on the
other hand, reasons that BMR is not restitution and as such is
permissible under the catchall provision of the supervised release statute. By and large, the circuits that prohibit BMR as a
condition of supervised release have not evaluated the possibility that it could be imposed under the catchall.13

27, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/EEX7-859S; Matt Gutman, et al, How Undercover
Cops in a FloridaCity Make Millions Selling Cocaine (ABC News, Oct 9, 2013), archived
at http://perma.cc/U3NH-TCGV.
7
See Howard A. Katz, Narcotics Investigations:Developing and Using Informants,
7 Police L Q 5, 11 (April 1978) (describing best practices for use of buy money during
criminal investigations); Robert H. Langworthy and James L. LeBeau, Temporal Evolution of a Sting Clientele, 9.2 Am J Police 101, 105-11 (1990) (explaining that the amount
of buy money needed for a store-front sting is expected to increase throughout the length
of the investigation).
8 See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub L No 98-473, 98 Stat 1987. See also
Part I.A.
9 142 F3d 160 (3d Cir 1998).
10 Id at 164.
11 See id at 168-70; Gall v United States, 21 F3d 107, 111-12 (6th Cir 1994).
12 See United States v Daddato, 996 F2d 903, 906 (7th Cir 1993).
13 The only Third or Sixth Circuit opinion to acknowledge this possibility is Judge
Nathaniel R. Jones's concurrence in United States v Gall, 21 F3d 107, 112-13 (6th Cir
1994) (Jones concurring). See Part III.B.
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This Comment agrees with the Seventh Circuit that BMR
should not be considered restitution because, as the courts have
already acknowledged, it does not involve payments to crime
victims. It further argues, however, that even though BMR is
not restitution, imposing it under the catchall is improper-but
for two reasons that the Third and Sixth Circuits do not seriously consider. First, BMR conditions conflict with a comprehensive
statutory scheme of criminal LFOs that already require a defendant to repay buy money. Punitive fines, criminal forfeiture,
and community restitution provide ample opportunity for the
defendant to disgorge her unlawful gains and face whatever
harm she has caused her victims or the community. Because the
process of imposing supervised release conditions does not include the same procedures and limits that are built into those
other tools, imposing BMR as a condition of supervised release
allows courts and prosecutors to end-run important procedural
protections. These tools enshrine congressional judgments about
not only the procedural protections due to defendants facing
criminal LFOs, but also how proceeds from those LFOs should
be disbursed. Finally, they give the government multiple avenues to seize back what it paid out.
Second, BMR conditions do not meet the substantive requirements that the supervised release statute sets for discretionary conditions. These binding statutory provisions require a
judge to consider whether each condition she imposes will further the goals of specific and general deterrence, as well as rehabilitation. As a rule, monetary conditions of supervised release work against those goals. While the supervised release
statute expressly allows some monetary conditions that might
help to ease a defendant's transition back to her community,
BMR is distinguishable from those conditions, as it does not further that purpose. Ultimately, the external and internal constraints on discretionary supervised release conditions work together to preclude BMR as a condition of supervised release.
I. FEDERAL SUPERVISED RELEASE, VICTIM-RESTITUTION
STATUTES, AND BUY MONEY

The question whether BMR is proper as a condition of supervised release implicates the history, purposes, and case law
of several federal criminal institutions, including federal supervised release itself, criminal restitution, and other criminal fines
and fees. Part LA begins by explaining the contours of federal
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supervised release and the practical import of supervised release
conditions. Part I.B then sets out the sources of authority for
criminal restitution, as well as the circuits' approaches to interpreting them. Finally, Part I.C explains the interpretive
methodology that has led circuit courts to unanimously disallow
imposition of BMR outside the context of supervised release.
Federal Supervised Release

A.

Supervised release is a federal program enacted by the
Sentencing Reform Act of 198414 as part of an effort to increase
certainty in federal sentences and reduce sentencing inequalities.15 Supervised release replaced parole in the federal system

and as such was not intended to be punitive.16 In keeping with
that paradigm, it was seen purely as an addition to a punitive
term of incarceration rather than as a replacement for any part
of the punitive sentence. 17 Practically, this means that a defendant completes her entire prison sentence before beginning a
term of supervised release.18 Legislative history makes clear that
supervised release was not intended to further the goals of punishment or retribution. Instead, its purpose was to "ease the defendant's transition into the community" and "provide rehabilitation to [the] defendant."19
A defendant sentenced to supervised release is required to
abide by certain conditions in order to avoid adverse consequences. The most typical and significant consequence is revocation, which results in a defendant's return to prison.20 Between
2005 and 2009, approximately one-third of defendants sentenced to supervised release had their release revoked and

Pub L No 98-473, 98 Stat 1987.
See Barbara Meierhoefer Vincent, Supervised Release: Looking for a Place in a
Determinate Sentencing System, 6 Fed Sent Rptr 187, 187 (1994).
16 Id at 187-88.
17 Id at 188.
18 Michael P. Kenstowicz, Comment, The Imposition of Discretionary Supervised
Release Conditions: Nudging Judges to Follow the Law, 82 U Chi L Rev 1411, 1415
(2015), citing Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1983, S Rep No 98-225, 98th Cong, 1st
Sess 37-39 (1983).
19 S Rep No 98-225 at 124 (cited in note 18) ('The Committee has concluded that
the sentencing purposes of incapacitation and punishment would not be served by a term
of supervised release-that the primary goal of such a term is to ease the defendant's
transition into the community . . . or to provide rehabilitation.").
20 See 18 USC § 3583(e)(3).
14
15
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were re-incarcerated.21 The combination of conditions imposed
on a defendant is decided by the sentencing judge. Judges must
apply several mandatory conditions from the list in 18 USC
§ 3583(d) and may choose to apply any of the discretionary conditions listed in 18 USC § 3563(b). The twenty-two available discretionary conditions include completing community service,22
working in "suitable employment,"23 undergoing medical or psychiatric treatment, 24 supporting dependents,25 and reporting to a
probation officer.26 Payment of "restitution to a victim of the offense" is included as a discretionary condition in 18 USC
§ 3563(b)(2). Repayment of buy money, on the other hand, is not
explicitly authorized by the statute. Finally, the statute provides
a catchall provision allowing judges to create additional discretionary conditions that are not explicitly provided for by the
statute, subject to some limitations.27
All discretionary conditions of supervised release are required to further the sentencing purposes enshrined in 18 USC
§ 3553(a) in two ways. First, discretionary conditions of supervised release must be "reasonably related"28 to "the nature and
circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics
of the defendant,"29 as well as to three of the four sentencing
purposes set out in 18 USC § 3553(a): "to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct,"30 "to protect the public from further
crimes of the defendant,"31 and "to provide the defendant with
needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other
correctional treatment in the most effective manner."32 This

21 US Sentencing Commission, Federal Offenders Sentenced to Supervised Release
*4 (July 2010), archived at http://perma.cc/425D-6VLB. This statistic represents a significant portion of all criminal defendants sentenced to prison. For the same time period,
district-court judges imposed supervised release to follow 99.1 percent of all prison sentences that exceeded one year and that did not statutorily require supervised release. Id
at *3-4.
22 18 USC § 3563(b)(12).
23 18 USC § 3563(b)(4).
24 18 USC § 3563(b)(9).
25 18 USC § 3563(b)(1).
26 18 USC § 3563(b)(15).
27
18 USC § 3583(d) (allowing the court to order "any other condition it considers to
be appropriate" as long as it fulfills the reasonable-relation and deprivation-of-liberty
requirements as described in notes 28-33 and accompanying text).
28 18 USC § 3583(d)(1).
29 18 USC § 3553(a)(1).
20
18 USC § 3553(a)(2)(B).
31
18 USC § 3553(a)(2)(C).
32 18 USC § 3553(a)(2)(D).
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Comment will refer to this first requirement as the reasonablerelation requirement and to the three goals as the generaldeterrence goal, specific-deterrence goal, and rehabilitation
goals, respectively. Second, the condition must "involve[] no
greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary for
the purposes"33 listed above

(the "deprivation-of-liberty

con-

straint").34 The statute requires each individual discretionary
condition to comply with both the reasonable-relation requirement and the deprivation-of-liberty constraint.31
These two requirements reflect the idea that supervised release conditions should be nonpunitive. Notably, the statute
does not require that conditions further 18 USC § 3553(a)(2)(A),
which requires that sentences "reflect the seriousness of the offense, [] promote respect for the law, and [] provide just punishment." This is a meaningful omission that distinguishes supervised release conditions from other criminal sanctionssupervised release conditions are not meant to be retributive or
punitive.36 Courts thus are not encouraged or required to consider retributive purposes when setting conditions of supervised
release.37
Courts have long exercised authority to strike down supervised release conditions that do not comport with the
reasonable-relation requirement and deprivation-of-liberty constraint because the conditions are inappropriate either for the
particular defendant or for her particular crime. Although the
reasonable-relation requirement and the deprivation-of-liberty
constraint are ostensibly analytically distinct, sentencing and
appellate courts do not usually conduct a two-step analysis. Instead, they combine the question of whether the condition at issue is reasonably related to the sentencing goals3s with the question of whether it represents "a greater deprivation of liberty
18 USC § 3583(d)(2).
34 Discretionary conditions are also required to fulfill a third requirement: they
33

must be "consistent with any pertinent policy statements issued by the Sentencing
Commission pursuant to 28 USC § 994(a)." 18 USC § 3583(d)(3). This requirement is not
relevant to the issues at stake in this Comment.
35 18 USC § 3583(d).
36 See Jennifer Bellott, Note, To Humiliate or Not to Humiliate: Does the Sentencing Reform Act Permit Public Shaming as a Condition of Supervised Release?, 38 U
Memphis L Rev 923, 925 (2008).
37 Indeed, at least one author has suggested that Congress's affirmative omission of
18 USC § 3553(a)(2)(A) suggests that judges are prohibited from considering those factors. See id at 937.
38 18 USC § 3583(d)(1).
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than is reasonably necessary" to fulfill those goals.39 For example, the Third Circuit in United States v Freeman4o struck down
a condition forbidding the defendant from using internet in his
home as "overly broad" under the deprivation-of-liberty constraint.4 1 Although it had previously upheld an identical condition in another case,42 the court distinguished the two cases by
noting that the previous defendant had actually used the internet to solicit inappropriate contact with children."
B.

Sources of Authority for Criminal Restitution

Much of the case law evaluating BMR as a condition of supervised release centers on whether it constitutes restitution.
This Section outlines the contours and limits of restitution in
the criminal context, tracing its historical development and
identifying its statutory sources.
Traditionally a civil-law concept," restitution has been increasingly employed in the criminal context in recent decades."
Just as civil restitution was historically relied on to force tortfeasors
to disgorge unlawful gains
to
their victims,
contemporary criminal restitution is imposed "to compensate

39 18 USC § 3583(d)(2). Borrowing from substantive due process case law, the
Second Circuit in United States v Myers, 426 F3d 117 (2d Cir 2005), suggested that under 18 USC § 3583(d)(2), a supervised release condition should be analyzed first with
regard to whether it implicates a "fundamental liberty interest" and, if so, whether it is
"narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest." Myers, 426 F3d at 126.
These prongs are not found in the statute itself, and such a test would seem to be even
more restrictive than the test that courts generally use, as it requires narrow tailoring.
The Second Circuit did not reach either of its prongs in that case, however, and I have
found no case offering a comprehensive breakdown of the factors clearly required by the
statute-the reasonable-relation requirement and its relationship with the deprivationof-liberty constraint. Instead, most courts of appeals seem to assume that any condition
of supervised release will cause some deprivation of liberty. Such a position is reasonable
given that all defendants on supervised release face the possibility of incarceration (in
addition to their original punitive sentences), which is undoubtedly a deprivation of liberty. The issue of re-incarceration is real and serious given the number of defendants
whose supervised release is revoked, as indicated in Part I.A.
40 316 F3d 386 (3d Cir 2003).
41

Id at 391-92.

42 United States v Crandon, 173 F3d 122, 125 (3d Cir 1999).
43 Freeman, 316 F3d at 392.
44 See generally Bridgett N. Shephard, Comment, Classifying Crime Victim Restitution: The TheoreticalArguments and Practical Consequences of Labeling Restitution as
Eithera Criminal or Civil Law Concept, 18 Lewis & Clark L Rev 801 (2014).
45 See Cortney E. Lollar, What Is Criminal Restitution?, 100 Iowa L Rev 93, 96-97
(2014) (discussing the rise in restitution as a criminal remedy in the wake of the victims'
rights movement of the 1980s).
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[victims of crimes] for economic, emotional, and psychological
losses."46
As is suggested above, criminal restitution-like civil restitution-has always required a victim. The existence of a victim
is inherent in the very concept of restitution, which is designed
at least in part to compensate victims for their losses. Black's
Law Dictionary defines "criminal restitution" as "[c]ompensation
for loss; esp., full or partial compensation paid by a criminal to a
victim."47 The payment by a person convicted of a crime (or in

the civil context, by a tortfeasor) to a victim-the person who
has been harmed-is thus at the very core of restitution. Secondary literature on criminal restitution generally agrees. The
existence of a victim is vital to one of the main purposes of restitution, as described by Bridgett Shephard: "When a victim is
harmed by crime and the perpetrator is identified, restitution
monies pay for the harm caused by the crime."48 Similarly, Professor Cortney E. Lollar writes that restitution fulfills two desires: "[t]he desire to 'make victims whole' accompan[ied] [by]
the desire, figuratively and literally, to 'make criminal defendants pay."'49 In fact, restitution as a criminal penalty rose in

prominence in large part because of the victims' rights movement of the 1980s.1 0 Whether or not victim compensation is the
primary goal or purpose of restitution, the existence of a victim
is an essential component of the concept.
Despite the increasing prevalence of restitution in criminal
cases, federal judges do not have any inherent authority to impose restitution. Instead, the circuits agree that judges can only
impose restitution when it is expressly authorized by statute.,"
As a result, federal courts impose restitution only in certain categories of cases. Although before 1982 "federal law authorized

Id at 97.
Black's Law Dictionary 1507 (Thomson Reuters 10th ed 2014).
Shephard, Comment, 18 Lewis & Clark L Rev at 804 (cited in note 44).
49 Lollar, 100 Iowa L Rev at 97 (cited in note 45).
50 Id at 96-97 (describing how victims' rights advocates pushed for criminal restitution as a way to make victims whole).
51 See United States v Brock-Davis, 504 F3d 991, 996 (9th Cir 2007). See also
United States v Bok, 156 F3d 157, 166 (2d Cir 1998); United States v DeSalvo, 41 F3d
505, 511 (9th Cir 1994); United States v Hicks, 997 F2d 594, 600 (9th Cir 1993); United
States v Helmsley, 941 F2d 71, 101 (2d Cir 1991); william M. Acker Jr, The Mandatory
Victims Restitution Act Is Unconstitutional:Will the Courts Say So after Southern Union
v. United States?, 64 Ala L Rev 803, 810 (2012) ("It goes without saying that a federal
court can only order restitution to the extent authorized by statute.").
46
47
48

2017]

Pay It Backward

1941

restitution only as a condition to a defendant's probation,"2 restitution can now be imposed in addition to incarceration as punishment for many crimes.
Since 1982, Congress has passed two major restitution statutes: the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 19823 (VWPA)
and the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 199654 (MVRA).
These acts authorize courts to impose restitution as part of the
sentence in cases involving certain types of crimes or victims.
Just as the supervised release statute provides for "restitution
to a victim of the offense,"55 the VWPA provides for "restitution
to any victim of such offense,"56 and the MVRA provides for "restitution to the victim of the offense."57 The VWPA, which was
passed in 1982 and covers most federal crimes,5s differs from the
MVRA in that it is completely discretionary.5e The MVRA, on the
other hand, requires courts to impose restitution to victims for a

small number of crimes.60 The VWPA and the MYRA authorize
payments only to victims, and they define "victim" identically as
"a person directly and proximately harmed as a result of the
commission of an offense for which restitution may be ordered."61

52 Acker, 64 Ala L Rev at 810 (cited in note 51).
53
Pub L No 97-291, 96 Stat 1248, codified as amended in various sections of
Title 18.
54
Pub L No 104-132, 110 Stat 1214, codified as amended in various sections of
Title 28. See also Shephard, Comment, 18 Lewis & Clark L Rev at 805-06 (cited in note
44) (describing the ways in which the victims' rights movement brought about the broader use of criminal restitution).
55 18 USC § 3563(b)(2).
56
VWPA § 5(a), 96 Stat at 1253, 18 USC § 3663(a)(1)(A).
57 MYRA § 204(a), 110 Stat at 1228, 18 USC § 3663A(a)(1).
58 For the current list of covered crimes, see 18 USC § 3663(a)(1)(A).
59 18 USC § 3663(a)(1)(A) ('The court . .. may order ... that the defendant make
restitution to any victim of such offense, or if the victim is deceased, to the victim's estate.") (emphasis added).
60 MVRA § 204(a), 110 Stat at 1228, 18 USC § 3663A(a)(1) ("[T]he court shall order
... that the defendant make restitution to the victim of the offense.") (emphasis added).
For the current list of crimes covered by the MVRA, see 18 USC § 3663A(c)(1)(A)(i)-(iv).
61 MVRA § 205(a), 110 Stat at 1230, 18 USC § 3663(a)(2) (amending the original
provisions of the VWPA); MVRA § 204(a), 110 Stat at 1228, 18 USC § 3663A(a)(2). Note
that in 1996 Congress broadened the VWPA through the MVRA to also allow "restitution
to persons other than the victim of the offense" "if agreed to by the parties in a plea
agreement." IVRA § 205(a), 110 Stat 1228, 18 USC § 3663(a)(1)(A). Originally,
§ 3663(a)(3) did refer to plea bargains but did not make clear whether plea bargains
could include restitution to individuals other than the victims: "The court may also order
restitution in any criminal case to the extent agreed to by the parties in a plea agreement." Comprehensive Thrift and Bank Fraud Prosecution and Taxpayer Recovery Act
of 1990 § 2509, Pub L No 101-647, 104 Stat 4859, 4863.
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Narrow Interpretation of Statutes Authorizing Criminal
Restitution

C.

Neither the VWPA nor the MVRA has been interpreted to
authorize courts to order defendants to repay buy money. Courts
generally cite Hughey v United States62 for this proposition.
Frasiel Hughey, a US Postal Service (USPS) employee accused
of unauthorized use of a credit card and stealing from his local
post office, pleaded guilty to unauthorized use of a credit card.63
In exchange, the Government dropped three counts of theft by a
USPS employee.64 Hughey was sentenced under the VWPA to
pay restitution to the victim-the owner of one credit card account-of the offense for which he was convicted. However, he
was also sentenced to pay restitution to the owners of several
other credit card accounts that the Government claimed he had
also defrauded, despite the fact that he was not charged with or
convicted of those additional offenses.65 The Supreme Court reversed the restitution order, holding that the VWPA could "compensate victims only for losses caused by the conduct underlying
the offense of conviction."66 The Court's holding in Hughey did
not directly address whether the government could be considered a victim under the VWPA, but it relied on a very narrow
reading of the VWPA for its conclusion.67
Although the Supreme Court has never expressly taken this
step, most circuits agree that Hughey's narrow reading of the
VWPA also dictates that the government is not a victim when it
voluntarily expends investigative funds in the form of buy money. Therefore, the courts reason, the government cannot recoup
buy money as restitution. Most circuits conclude that the government cannot be a victim of a crime that it planned itself. The
Ninth Circuit, for example, reasoned that "the government is not
a victim under the Act. . . . The government wanted false identi-

fication papers as evidence of criminal activity and obtained
them; the government got what it paid for."68 Similarly, the
Sixth Circuit contrasts the government in this context with
more typical crime victims, concluding that "[t]he [VWPA] aims

62
63
64

65
66
67

68

495 US 411 (1990).
Id at 413.
Id at 416-22.
Id at 413-14.
Hughey, 495 US at 416.
See id at 416-22.
United States v Salcedo-Lopez, 907 F2d 97, 99 (9th Cir 1990).
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to protect victims, not to safeguard the government's financial
interest in funds used as bait to apprehend offenders."69 The
First,70 Seventh,71 and Eleventh72 Circuits agree. Consequently,
there is no meaningful disagreement among the circuits as to
whether BMR is authorized by the VWPA. However, the circuits
disagree about whether judges can impose BMR in a different
context: supervised release.
II. THE DISAGREEMENT: SHOULD BUY-MONEY REPAYMENT BE
EVALUATED UNDER THE RESTITUTION PROVISION OR THE
CATCHALL PROVISION?
Courts disagree as to whether BMR is a proper condition of
supervised release. In its current formulation, that disagreement turns on whether BMR is a form of restitution. Circuits
that treat BMR as restitution analyze it under the restitution
provision of the supervised release statute, finding that restitution is not proper because buy-money schemes do not involve a
victim. The Seventh Circuit, on the other hand, does not

69 United States v Meacham, 27 F3d 214, 218 (6th Cir 1994). See also Gall v United
States, 21 F3d 107, 110-12 (6th Cir 1994). In reaching this conclusion, the Meacham
court cited a previous decision in which it held that investigation or prosecution costs
more generally could not be imposed under the VWPA. Meacham, 27 F3d at 218
("[Rlestitution may not be awarded under the VWPA for investigation or prosecution
costs incurred in the offense of conviction."), quoting Ratliff v United States, 999 F2d
1023, 1026 (6th Cir 1993).
70 United States v Gibbens, 25 F3d 28, 36 (1st Cir 1994) ("[A] government agency
that has lost money as a consequence of a crime that it actively provoked in the course of
carrying out an investigation may not recoup that money through a restitution order imposed under the VWPA."). Based on its reasoning, however, it is possible that the First
Circuit would determine that the government is a victim when it expends buy money in
the context of reverse stings if the defendant attempted to defraud the government itself.
In this case, Leroy Gibbens bought food stamps from an undercover agent at 25 cents to
the dollar, ultimately purchasing $12,895 worth of stamps (for one-fourth of that
amount). The court sentenced Gibbens to six months in prison and three years of supervised release, as well as a fine of $15,230 (the face value of the food stamps, plus the
government's cost of acquiring the food stamps on the black market in the first place). In
dicta the First Circuit reasoned that while the government is usually thought not to be a
victim for purposes of restitution under the VWPA, it may be more like a victim when
"the crime was designed to inflict harm on the government." The court ultimately applied the rule of lenity to the VWPA, however, and held that the government could not
recoup its losses under the VWPA. Id at 30-36.
71
United States v Munoz, 549 Fed Appx 552, 554-55 (7th Cir 2013) ("[T]he government is not a victim when it fronts buy money."); United States v Cook, 406 F3d 485,
489 (7th Cir 2005) ("The buy money was an investigatory expense rather than property
taken from, or damage to the property of, a victim of the defendant's crime.").
72
United States v Khawaja, 118 F3d 1454, 1460 (11th Cir 1997) ("Nor is the IRS a
victim under VWPA.").
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consider BMR to be restitution and evaluates it under the
catchall provision. This approach leads the Seventh Circuit to
allow BMR as a condition of supervised release. Ultimately, this
Part argues that BMR is not restitution.
The Third and Sixth Circuits: Buy-Money Repayment Is Not
a Permissible Condition

A.

The Third and Sixth Circuits, which both see BMR as a
form of restitution, have clearly ruled that it is not permissible
as a condition of supervised release. The assumption that BMR
is restitution is a fundamental part of their reasoning because it
causes them to analyze BMR under the restitution provision of
the supervised release statute instead of the catchall provision.
In short, these circuits conclude that if BMR does not conform to
the restitution provision, it cannot be a proper condition of supervised release.
In the case of Cottman, the Third Circuit's understanding of
BMR as a form of restitution led it to find that it was impermissible as a condition of supervised release. In that case, the court
considered whether defendant Cottman could be required to repay the $32,420 that he had received from an undercover FBI
agent to whom he had sold 231 stolen cable boxes.73 The district
court had sentenced him to ten months in prison and three years
of supervised release as a condition of which Cottman was to repay the $32,420.74 Cottman appealed the sentence, arguing that
the FBI was not a victim of his crime and had expended the
funds voluntarily.75 The Third Circuit first considered whether
the government could be treated as a "victim" as required under
18 USC § 3563(b), the restitution provision of the supervised release statute. 76 It held that the government was not a victim, citing its own and other circuits' holdings that the government is
not a victim under other victim-restitution statutes like the
VWPA and MVRA.77 Because "restitution to a victim" is included
in the list of possible supervised release conditions78 and because
the government is not considered a victim (at least under the
parallel provision in the VWPA), the Third Circuit held that the

73
74
75

Cottman, 142 F3d at 163.

76

18 USC § 3563(b)(2). See also Cottman, 142 F3d at 169.
See Cottman, 142 F3d at 169. See also Part I.C.
18 USC § 3563(b)(2).

77
78

Id at 164.
Id at 168.
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order was improper.79 The court reasoned that allowing any other type of restitution under the catchall provision would allow it
to "swallow the rule."80
In Gall v United States,81 the Sixth Circuit also began from
the principle that BMR was restitution and struck down a condition of supervised release that required it. In that case, the defendant, John Gall, pleaded guilty to four drug crimes after selling drugs to undercover government agents. The district court
sentenced him to twenty-seven months in prison and three years
of supervised release, requiring as a condition of the release that
he repay the buy money that the government expended.82 Gall
appealed.83 Using the same reasoning as the Third Circuit, the
Sixth Circuit vacated the BMR condition.84
Although the Third and Sixth Circuits do not mention it,
they may have another textual argument in favor of their interpretation of the supervised release statute's restitution provision. The provision allows "restitution to a victim of the offense
under section 3556"85-the same section that acts as the mechanism for imposing restitution under 18 USC § 3663 (VWPA) and
18 USC § 3663A (MVRA).86 Restitution under the supervised release statute, then, is not distinct from the type of restitution allowed by the VWPA and the MVRA. Instead, it uses the same
mechanisms and, therefore, the same definitions. Even if it

could be argued that "victim" in 18 USC § 3563(b)(2) does not
79 Cottman, 142 F3d at 169. See also Part I.C.
80 Id at 169-70. Unsurprisingly, the dissent in Cottman pointed out that the district court had simply been working within the scope of a preprinted form and that it
should be given some leeway to impose a condition that might be proper under the
catchall, despite the fact that it had categorized it on the form as restitution. Id at 171
(Ludwig concurring in part and dissenting in part).
81 21 F3d 107 (6th Cir 1994).
82

Id at 108.

83

Id.

Id at 108-11. While the Second Circuit also has not confronted this issue directly, its reasoning in United States v Varrone, 554 F3d 327 (2d Cir 2009), suggests that it
might also fall in line with the Third and Sixth Circuits. There, the Second Circuit applied Hughey's narrow reading of the VWPA to the restitution provision of the supervised release statute, holding that because the victim's loss was not caused by the defendant, the defendant could not be held responsible for restitution. Id at 333. Similarly,
the First Circuit's decision in United States v Gibbens, 25 F3d 28 (1st Cir 1994), because
it focuses so heavily on whether the government is a victim of the crime, might also take
the same approach as the Third and Sixth Circuits, deciding this issue under the restitution provision rather than the catchall provision of the supervised release statute. See
Gibbens, 25 F3d at 32-33. See also note 70.
85 18 USC § 3563(b)(2).
86 18 USC § 3556.
84
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carry the same meaning as "victim" under the VWPA at
§ 3663(a)(1)(A), § 3563(b)(2) actually points, through § 3556, to
the VWPA and its mechanisms and definitions. This fact suggests that the restitution provision in the supervised release
statute should be read to have the same limits as the VWPA and
the MVRA. Because the circuits agree that BMR is not allowed
under those statutes, a court could reason that it should not be
allowed in the supervised release context, either.87
B.

The Seventh Circuit: Buy-Money Repayment Is a
Permissible Condition

The major difference between the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of the statute and that of the other circuits is that the
Seventh Circuit does not treat BMR as restitution. It reasons
that the government is not a victim in the buy-money context,
the same conclusion reached by the Third and Sixth Circuits.38
But instead of finding BMR improper under the restitution provision of the statutory release statute for that reason, the
Seventh Circuit concludes that BMR is not restitution at all. In
doing so, it removes its analysis entirely from the restitution
provision of the statute and finds instead that BMR is valid as a
discretionary condition imposed under the catchall provision of
18 USC § 3563(b).
The Seventh Circuit first took the position that BMR may
not be restitution in United States v Daddato.89 James Daddato
pleaded guilty after selling hallucinogenic mushrooms to undercover law enforcement officers.90 As a condition of supervised release, the district court required that Daddato pay back the
$3,650 that he had received from undercover law enforcement
officers as payment. 91 The Seventh Circuit unanimously upheld
the condition. In its decision, it suggested briefly that repayment
of buy money may not be restitution at all: "On the one hand, it
seems unrealistic to describe the defendant as having wrongfully taken money eagerly tendered to him so that he could
87 See Gustafson v Alloyd Co, 513 US 561, 570 (1995) (concluding that a word has
the same meaning when used twice in the same act). The idea here is similar: statutory
language at one location in the code should retains its meaning whether it is relied on as
part of the VWPA or as part of the supervised release scheme.
88 See Part II.A. In fact, this is the same reasoning that the circuits all generally
agree on, as described in Part I.C.
89 996 F2d 903 (7th Cir 1993).
90 Id at 904.

91

Id.
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incriminate himself. On the other hand, it was money that he
obtained through criminal activity and therefore had no right to
keep."92 It did not find that possibility important to its conclusion, however: "The list in section 3563(b) is not limited to restitution, or even to conditions that resemble restitution .

.

. ; it is

enough that the order to repay the buy money is of the same
general kind as the items in the list, and it is."93 The Seventh

Circuit did not describe what it considered the "general kind" of
the items in the list to be.
Instead, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the interpretation of the word "victim" under the VWPA should not necessarily
be extended to the word "victim" in the restitution provision of
the supervised release statute. It gave several reasons for its refusal to make this extension. The court reasoned that Hughey
and other cases interpreting the VWPA are not applicable to the
supervised release context; the VWPA is concerned with how to
make victims and witnesses whole, while supervised release has
its own distinct goals and guidelines.94 Judge Richard Posner
was also careful to explain that the VWPA did not take up the
entire field of federal criminal restitution.95
While the Seventh Circuit in Daddato offered various reasons for upholding the BMR condition, in subsequent cases it
began to rely almost exclusively on its conclusion that BMR is
not restitution and is thus permissible under the catchall. Specifically, in United States v Munoz,96 the Seventh Circuit explicitly refused to overrule Daddato and upheld a BMR order as a
condition of supervised release under the catchall provision but
not as restitution under the VWPA.97 The Seventh Circuit drew
a clear line between BMR imposed under the VWPA and BMR
imposed as a condition of supervised release, going so far as to
suggest that BMR erroneously imposed under the former could
simply be modified to the latter on appeal.98 Later, in United
States v Williams,99 the Seventh Circuit provided explicit reasoning for its conclusion that BMR is not restitution: "The federal
criminal code, including the supervised-release statute, defines
92

Id at 905.

93
94
95

Daddato, 996 F2d at 905.

96
97

98
99

Id at 905-06.
Id.
549 Fed Appx 552 (7th Cir 2013).
Id at 555 ("Munoz offers no new argument for why Daddatoshould be overruled.").
See id at 555-56.
739 F3d 1064 (7th Cir 2014).
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restitution as payment of losses sustained by victims of crime
...

and the government is not deemed a victim."loo Departing

from the reasoning in Daddato that the restitution provision
should not be interpreted in light of the MYRA and VWPA, the
Williams court reached its conclusion by reasoning that interpreting the meaning of "victim" under the VWPA and MVRAo1
is essential to understanding the definition of "victim"-and
therefore also the definition of restitution itself. Because restitution requires a victim, and the government is not a victim when
it expends buy money, BMR is not restitution.102 The court thus

moved the analysis definitively from the restitution provision to
the catchall provision.
Throughout these cases, the Seventh Circuit has acknowledged the fact that it is alone among the circuits in its interpretation of the supervised release statute but nonetheless has
doubled down on its precedent. In United States v Brooks,103 for
example, the court acknowledged the concurring opinion in Gall
but was not swayed by it: "We stand by Daddato as a better interpretation of the law."104 In United States v Gibbs,105 another

case involving drug buy money, the Seventh Circuit upheld the
condition and again acknowledged the circuit split.106 Along
these lines, the Seventh Circuit's approach to the question has
developed to evaluate BMR in an entirely different framework
from that used by the Third and Sixth Circuits. While the Third
and Sixth Circuits weigh BMR's appropriateness under the restitution provision of the supervised release statute, the Seventh

Id at 1067, citing 18 USC § 3663A(c), Cook, 406 F3d at 489, Cottman, 142 F3d at
168-70, Gall, 21 F3d at 112, and United States v Salcedo-Lopez, 907 F2d 97, 98-99 (9th
Cir 1990). The Seventh Circuit thus used the very same fact that the Third and Sixth
Circuits used to find BMR improper under the restitution provision to reach an entirely
different conclusion-that BMR should not be evaluated under that provision at all.
101 See Part I.C.
102 The Seventh Circuit also interpreted Cottman as holding "that repayment of buy
money is not restitution." Williams, 739 F3d at 1065, citing Cottman, 142 F3d at 170.
While the Third Circuit did explain in its decision that BMR could likely be imposed as
part of a criminal fine instead of as restitution, it also insisted that an order treating
BMR as restitution be struck down. Additionally-because it was an order of restitution-the court reasoned that allowing it under the catchall provision would "swallow
the rule." Cottman, 142 F3d at 170.
103 114 F3d 106 (7th Cir 1997).
104 Id at 108.
105 578 F3d 694 (7th Cir 2009).
106 Id at 696 ("We acknowledge that other circuits disagree, but we decline to over-

100

rule our long-standing precedent.").
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Circuit has shifted almost entirely to analyzing it under the
catchall.

As described above, the current circuit split implicates two
issues: (1) whether BMR should be considered a form of restitution and, (2) if not, whether it can be imposed under the catchall
provision. The circuit courts that refuse to permit BMR as a
condition of supervised release have thus far reached that conclusion by assuming that BMR is a form of restitution that is
precluded by the restitution provision of the supervised release
statute. Even the Seventh Circuit agrees that BMR cannot be
properly imposed under that provision.107 Instead, the Seventh
Circuit allows imposition of BMR under the catchall provision.os

The other circuits, however, have not engaged in any comprehensive analysis of that possibility.
III. Buy MONEY UNDER THE CATCHALL PROVISION: EXTERNAL
AND INTERNAL CONSTRAINTS

While the Third and Sixth Circuits have focused primarily
on whether BMR is permissible as a form of restitution, they
have not considered at any length the Seventh Circuit's premise
that BMR is not restitution at all.09 Part III.A argues that the
Seventh Circuit is likely correct in its conclusion that BMR is
not restitution. Parts III.B and C then set forth a comprehensive
framework to evaluate BMR under the catchall provision, ultimately concluding-unlike the Seventh Circuit-that BMR is
improper under that provision.
A.

Not Restitution: Locating BMR under the Catchall
Provision

BMR is not restitution because it does not provide compensation to a victim of a crime. As discussed in Part I.B, and as the
Seventh Circuit concludes,"o the concept of restitution is predicated on the existence of a victim to receive it. And as discussed
in Part I.C, the circuit courts are in agreement that the government is not a victim when it expends buy money. While the term
107

Munoz, 549 Fed Appx at 555.

108 Daddato, 996 F3d at 905.
109 For the sole exception to this, see Part III.B.

110 See Part II.B.
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"victim restitution" seems to suggest a certain type or subset of
restitution, it is simply redundant in that the term "restitution"
already implies a victim-adding the word "victim" to it does not
add meaning. In fact, nonvictim restitution does not exist. There
is no restitution provision in any part of the federal criminal
code that purports to provide a benefit for a party other than
someone harmed by a crime (a victim)."' So when the Third and

Sixth Circuits focus on whether the government is a victim, the
fundamental implication is not only that BMR is an improper
form of restitution (as they acknowledge), but that it is not restitution at all. And while they do not acknowledge the possibility
that BMR is not restitution, they do acknowledge that BMR
could be effectuated through other penalties, such as fines.112

Because the Third and Sixth Circuits rely on the assumption that BMR is a form of restitution, their line of reasoning is
irrelevant if it is not. On the other hand, the structure of federal
sentencing generally and the supervised release statute specifically both provide other ways to evaluate the lawfulness of
BMR as a supervised release condition under the catchall
provision. These tools and standards are relevant whether
BMR is restitution or not.
Besides BMR, there is only one other type of LFO that is
regularly imposed as a condition of supervised release: judges
often require that defendants pay fines or judgments that either
3
predate or arise from the current case." Indeed, I could find no
other financial conditions of supervised release imposed since
the program began in 1984, except for the requirement that

.

111 The community restitution statute discussed below in Part III.B.3 is the ostensible exception that proves the rule. Under that statute, courts are required to determine
to
how much harm has been caused to the community and then to order restitution
community institutions that are tasked with repairing that harm in some way. The
community restitution statute thus allows for restitution to more-nebulous victims who
traditionally have not been able to recover restitution. But it does not authorize restitution to any party who could not be considered a victim at all. See Part III.B.3.
112 See, for example, Cottman, 142 F3d at 169 n 14 (suggesting that district courts
order a fine in lieu of BMR if they are concerned with ensuring defendants do not profit
from buy money).
113 These conditions are far less problematic than BMR under the statutory scheme
described in Part III.A because the fines and fees that underlie the conditions have been
time
arrived at through the processes and procedures dictated by that scheme. By the
for
repayment of a defendant's punitive fine is made a condition of supervised release,
of
burdens
the
and
fines
on
limits
statutory
the
example, she has already benefited from
proof that they are subjected to, as described below in Part III.B.
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defendants pay the costs of their supervision, which is discussed
in greater detail below.1"
There are two possible reasons why judges do not impose
new LFOs as conditions of supervised release. Taken together,
they provide a strong legal argument against imposing BMR
under the catchall provision. First, a statutory scheme of criminal fines, forfeiture, and community restitution external to the
supervised release statute already takes into account a defendant's illegal gains and the losses she has caused to others. Second, LFOs, such as BMR, are not compatible with the supervised release statute's internal requirements for discretionary
conditions.
B.

External Constraints: A Statutory Scheme of Fines and
Fees

Federal statutes provide a robust set of instruments for extracting financial payments from criminal defendants. The existence and comprehensiveness of these tools is significant to
this analysis in two primary ways. First, judges who forgo imposing BMR do not have to be concerned that the government
will not be reimbursed its costs or that the defendant will avoid
disgorging unlawful gains. Second, and perhaps most importantly, imposition of BMR allows courts and prosecutors to evade the
protections defendants are due under this statutory scheme.
Moreover, imposition of BMR requires ignoring congressional
judgments about how proceeds from these fines and fees should
be distributed.
1.

Punitive fines.

Judges are required to take buy money into account when
setting punitive fines for criminal defendants. 18 USC § 3572(a)
states that judges "shall" consider, among other factors, "any pecuniary loss inflicted upon others as a result of the offense" and
"the need to deprive the defendant of illegally obtained gains
from the offense."115 These two factors consequently require the

judge to consider any buy money expended or received when she
determines the amount of the defendant's fine. The first factor,
§ 3572(a)(3), should encompass the government's investigative
expenses, including buy money, as the buy-money expenditure is
114

See Part III.B.1.
§ 3572(a)(3), (5) (emphasis added).

115 18 USC
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certainly a "loss" for the government that is a "result" of the underlying offense.116 Section 3572(a)(3) should not be interpreted
to have the same narrow limits as victim restitution because
"whether restitution is ordered or made" is yet another factor in
the § 3572(a) analysis.117 This indicates that "loss inflicted upon
others" is a distinct category without the definitional limits that
exclude buy money from the victim-restitution statutes. Alternatively, § 3572(a)(5) ("illegally obtained gains") could also be interpreted to include the defendant's buy-money earnings because buy money is always earned in an illegal transaction and
is thus "illegally obtained."118

Along these lines, the presence of 18 USC § 3572(a)(3) and
(5) in the punitive-fine equation works to ensure that the defendant will disgorge any unlawful gains and that the government will seize back its expenditure of buy money. To the extent
the defendant can argue that § 3572(a)(5) does not pertain to her
because she did not benefit personally from the government's
buy-money payment-perhaps because she passed buy money
from a drug sale on to a dealer higher up in her criminal organization-§ 3573(a)(3) still ensures that the judge will take into
account the government's loss of buy money. Additionally,
although the federal fine statute generally and other crime statutes individually set limits on the amount of fines that can be
imposed for certain crimes,119 the fine statute provides an exception if the defendant "derives pecuniary gain from the offense, or
if the offense results in pecuniary loss to a person other than the
defendant."120 In those cases, the court is permitted to fine the
defendant twice the amount of the "gross" loss or gain.121 Allowing the court to take gross gain or loss into account protects the
government from a statutory maximum fine that is lower than
its buy-money expenditure. It also protects the government from
any possible argument by the defendant that only net gain or
loss should be included in the fine. That is, that the government's loss should be limited by what it gained from the
116 See 18 USC § 3572(a)(3).
117 18 USC § 3572(a)(4). See also United States v Juanico, 2015 WL 10383206, *11

n 8 (D NM) ("Congress listed this factor separately from the restitution factor, and the
court should seek to give that drafting decision content.").
118 18 USC § 3572(a)(5).
119 See, for example, 18 USC § 3571(b)(1)-(7).
120 18 USC § 3571(d). See also USSG § 5E1.2 (establishing factors for setting fines
that closely resemble those Congress set forth in § 3571).
121 18 USC § 3571(d).
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transaction (in drug cases, for example, the government might
theoretically have "gained" drugs or evidence)122 or that the defendant's gain should be limited by her costs in the transaction
(the cost of obtaining the illicit goods in the first place, for example).123 The provisions of the fine statute thus guarantee that
the government will be able to fully seize back what it paid out
in buy money.
It could be argued that including the defendant's gain or the
government's loss in the fine calculation is not intended to simply reimburse the government but is also a factor in arriving at
an appropriate retributive estimate of the penalty the defendant
should pay. That is, considering the loss amount is not a mechanism to recover costs and disgorge gains but a form of criminal
punishment in itself. As a result, including it in a fine would
serve a different purpose than BMR and would therefore not be
a true replacement for either disgorgement by the defendant or
reimbursement to the government. The text of the fine statute
precludes this argument. 18 USC § 3572(a)(5) addresses "the
need to deprive the defendant of illegally obtained gains." That
wording suggests that 18 USC § 3572(a)(5) requires deprivation
and repayment of specific proceeds, not an overarching punitive
penalty (although repayment can often be punitive in itself).
Consequently, there is a strong argument that the purpose of
§ 3572(a)(5) is to actually recover illegal gains, meaning that it
should work as a perfect substitute for BMR in that regard.
The fact that the fine statute requires complete disgorgement and reimbursement is a strong argument against also allowing BMR in the supervised release context. In fact, the
Second Circuit dealt with an analogous issue in United States v
Mordini,124 a case about a supervised release condition requiring
a defendant to repay the costs of his supervision. The court in
Mordini reasoned that if a judge is required to impose costs under the fine statute, she cannot impose those costs in another
context. 125 Mordini involved a provision of the fine statute that
instructs judges to consider "the expected costs to the
122 For an example of this sort of argument, see United States v Salcedo-Lopez, 907
F2d 97, 99 (9th Cir 1990) ("The government wanted false identification papers as evidence of criminal activity and obtained them; the government got what it paid for.").
123 See United States v BP Products North America Inc, 610 F Supp 2d 655, 683 (SD
Tex 2009) ("'Gross' pecuniary gain or loss simply means that the court is not to reduce
the amounts to a net sum, by deducting such items as costs.").
124 366 F3d 93 (2d Cir 2004).
125 Id at 94-95.
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government of any imprisonment, supervised release, or probation component of the sentence" in setting fines.126 As of 1997,

the US Sentencing Guidelines also instruct judges to take those
costs into account. 127 In the years since then, courts have occasionally included explicit "cost of supervision" fines in a defendant's sentence.128 In Mordini, the trial court "purported to assess
no fine ...

but instead assessed [defendant Edward] Mordini

$9,741 to pay the costs of his supervision."129 Under the
Sentencing Guidelines, however, the maximum fine for which
Mordini was eligible was $5,000.130 Evaluating the cost-ofsupervision fee as a fine under the Guidelines and the statute,
the Second Circuit restricted the district court to the Guidelines
limit of $5,000 and remanded the case to let the district court
explain whether it had good reason to depart from the
Guidelines.11 The Second Circuit thus prohibited the district
court from imposing the cost-of-supervision fee apart from its
punitive fine. It based that holding on the fact that the cost of
supervision was included among the factors to be taken into account under the fine statute and the Guidelines.132
This same reasoning should be applied to BMR. Becauselike the cost of supervision-BMR is already required to be imposed under the fine statute by § 3572(a)(3) and (5), it should
not be allowed outside the fine statute. Specifically, it should not
be allowed as a condition of supervised release. And when a district court attempts to impose it as a condition of supervised release, the circuit court should ensure that the practical consequences of that mistake for the defendant are limited to the
maximum allowable amount of the fine under either the
33
Guidelines or the statute.1

126 18 USC § 3572(a)(6).
127 USSG Appx C, Volume I, Amend 572.
128 See, for example, United States v Tiser, 170 Fed Appx 396, 398-99 (6th Cir 2006).
129 Mordini, 366 F3d at 94.

130 Id.
131 Id at 94-95.
132 Id at 94. The First Circuit took a similar approach to evaluating a cost-ofsupervision LFO in United States v Chan, 208 Fed Appx 13 (1st Cir 2006). In that
case, although the district court had improperly assigned the LFO as a condition of
supervised release, the court reasoned that mistake was not an abuse of discretion, as
the full amount of the fine plus the cost of supervision was still less than the statutory
limit. Id at 16.
133 The Sixth Circuit took this approach in Tiser, 170 Fed Appx at 399 (holding that
the defendant's combined cost of incarceration and cost-of-supervision fines could not
exceed the Guidelines limit).
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The cost-of-supervision analogy above hints at perhaps the
greatest problem with BMR as a condition of supervised release:
when defendants are subjected to fees outside the punitive-fine
structure that should be (or are already) imposed within it, they
(and others) lose the scant protections it provides. In addition to
placing monetary limits on fines as indicated above,134 the fine
statute circumscribes punitive fines both substantively and procedurally. Substantively, for example, § 3572 requires that sentencing courts consider "the burden that the fine will impose upon the defendant [or] any person who is financially dependent on
the defendant."135 This evaluation could be valuable in ensuring
that a defendant's family is not unduly harmed by her sentence.
Similarly, the statute requires that judges consider "whether the
defendant can pass on to consumers or other persons the expense of the fine."136 This factor could be important in protecting
community members from the ripple effects of the defendant's
sentence. The statute also requires that any fine imposed "not
impair the ability of the defendant to make restitution" if she is
otherwise

required

to

do

so. 137 This

requirement

reflects

Congress's express preference for how the benefits LFOs are distributed. Imposing additional LFOs outside the fine statute,
such as BMR, interferes with this legislative judgment. Procedurally, 18 USC § 3613A(a)(2) requires that a judge evaluate the
willfulness of a defendant's failure to make payments on a punitive fine before deciding to revoke her supervised release as a
consequence. 138 A defendant who misses a BMR payment during
her term of supervised release, on the other hand, could be denied the benefit of this protection.139
Imposing BMR as a condition of supervised release instead
of or in addition to a fine is thus an end run around the statutory protections imposed by the fine statute and may even be an
evasion of the Sixth Amendment jury trial right. In Southern
Union Co v United States,140 the Supreme Court applied

134
135
136

137
138

18 USC
18 USC
18 USC
18 USC
18 USC

§ 3571(b).
§ 3572(a)(2).
§ 3572(a)(7).
§ 3572(b).
§ 3613A(a)(2).

139 There is no general willfulness standard for finding violations of supervised re-

lease conditions under the revocation procedures set forth in 18 USC
FRCrP 32.1(b), or USSG § 7B1.3.
140 567 US 343 (2012).

§ 3583(e)(3),
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Apprendi v New Jersey141 to criminal fines and held that any fact

that increases a fine above the statutory limit must be submitted to a jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt.142 The fine at
issue was based on the number of days that the defendant company was in violation of environmental statutes, and the
Supreme Court vacated it because the jury had only found that
the defendant violated the statute for at least "one day."143 Because the jury had not decided the exact number of days for
which the defendant should be fined, the ultimate amount of the
fine was based on facts that were not found by a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt. As is illustrated above by Mordini,1"4 costs of

prosecution and supervision like BMR may rise above statutory
limits. When a sentencing judge imposes BMR as a condition of
supervised release, the amount of buy money originally expended is not subject to jury testing. If BMR were included in a fine,
on the other hand, any amount over the statutory maximum
would need to be jury tested.145
Finally, interpreting the supervised release statute to allow
BMR creates a logically absurd result. Because judges are
required146 to take the defendant's gain47 and the government's
141 530 US 466 (2000) (holding that any fact that increases a defendant's penalty
beyond the statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt).
142 Southern Union, 567 US at 349.
143 Id at 347.
144 See notes 129-32 and accompanying text.
145 It is important to note, however, that fines resulting from "petty" underlying offenses are not subject to the Sixth Amendment at all. Southern Union, 567 US at 350.
Whether an offense is petty is evaluated by the "severity of the maximum authorized
penalty." Blanton v City of North Las Vegas, 489 US 538, 541 (1989). That is, for Sixth
Amendment purposes, what matters is whether the underlying offense triggers the jury
trial right under Apprendi, not whether the fine meets some monetary threshold. As a
result, offenses that trigger the Sixth Amendment jury trial right should trigger the
right for purposes of calculating both the length of incarceration and the amount of the
fine. See Southern Union, 567 US at 350 ("Where a fine is so insubstantial that the underlying offense is considered 'petty,' the Sixth Amendment right of jury trial is not triggered, and no Apprendi issue arises."). Note also that circuits disagree on the question
whether restitution is a criminal fine subject to Apprendi. Therefore, if BMIR is restitution, Apprendi may not actually apply to it. Contrast United States v Kieffer, 596 Fed
Appx 653, 664 (10th Cir 2014) (holding restitution to be a civil remedy when Apprendi
does not apply), with United States v Leahy, 438 F3d 328, 333-35 (3d Cir 2006) (holding
that restitution is "criminal rather than civil in nature"). Regardless, however, there is
no dispute that Apprendi applies to fines, so it certainly applies to buy money calculated
as part of a fine. This means that imposing BMR outside the fine statute functions as an
end run around Apprendi.
146 The statute states that judges "shall" consider these factors. 18 USC § 3572(a).
147 18 USC § 3572(a)(5).
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loss14s into account in setting fines, it is theoretically possible

that defendants who are ordered to repay buy money as a condition of supervised release could ultimately repay their buy money twice. Given the large number of factors judges consider in
setting fines (as well as the fact that they often are not clear
about how they arrive at the ultimate number), it is difficult to
know whether this happens in fact.149 Regardless of whether defendants actually repay buy money twice, however, judges applying the fine statute faithfully should include the amount of
buy money in a defendant's fine. And if such a judge also imposes BMR, double counting by including buy money in a fine as
well is not only possible but legally required. This possibilitywhether or not it manifests in practice-indicates that interpreting the supervised release statute to allow BMR generates an
outcome unmoored from its stated justifications.
2.

Criminal forfeiture.

Criminal forfeiture provides an even more obvious route for
the government to reclaim buy money. Criminal forfeiture is
available for many crimes, including all crimes covered under
the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of
1970.150 Property subject to forfeiture under that act includes

"any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds the
person obtained, directly or indirectly, as the result of [the] violation."151 That definition easily encompasses buy money in drug
cases.1 52 To effect forfeiture, the government must identify the
property in its indictment and, after convicting the defendant of
a drug crime, prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
property "either constitutes or was purchased with proceeds
from the crime."153

18 USC § 3572(a)(3).
149 I did not find any case in which a party stated that the defendant was being
fined for the amount of the buy money and was also required to repay buy money as a
condition of supervised release.
150 Pub L No 91-513, 84 Stat 1236, codified as amended in various sections of
Title 21.
151 21 USC § 853(a)(1).
152 United States v Garcia-Guizar,160 F3d 511, 519 (9th Cir 1998) (allowing the
forfeiture of $4,300 in buy money).
153 United States v Messino, 122 F3d 427, 428 (7th Cir 1997).
148
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While the government could also pursue civil forfeiture of
buy money, 15 4 criminal forfeiture should be especially easy to obtain in most cases. At a hearing to determine whether the property is connected to the crime, for example, the criminal forfeiture statute allows the court to consider evidence inadmissible
55
under the Federal Rules of Evidence.1 Additionally, in drug
cases, a felony conviction establishes a rebuttable presumption
that any part of the defendant's property is subject to forfeiture
if the government can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant acquired it during or after her illegal
activities and that there is no other "likely source for such property."156 Finally, in cases in which defendants have passed the

buy money on to another party, the court can order forfeiture of
"any other property of the defendant, up to the value of"157 the
property that "has been transferred or sold to, or deposited with,
a third party."158

In this way, the criminal forfeiture statute strikes an uneasy balance between allowing the government to easily seize
tainted property like buy money and providing some limited protections of defendants' due process rights.159 The requirement
that the government charge the amount to be forfeited in the indictment and prove it by a preponderance of the evidence, for
example, protects defendants from the possibility of being required to pay based solely on the government's allegations. No
such statutory protections are available for BMR as a condition
of supervised release. While it is theoretically possible that the
government is consistently reliable in its allegations of buymoney expenditures, it is impossible to know with certainty
without any factual investigation of those allegations.160
154

See, for example, United States v Premises Known as 3639-2nd Street, NE,

Minneapolis, Minnesota, 869 F2d 1093, 1097 (8th Cir 1989) (allowing the forfeiture of
$12,585 in buy money).
155 21 USC § 853(e)(3).
156 21 USC § 853(d)(1)-(2).
157 21 USC § 853(p)(2).
158 21 USC § 853(p)(1)(B). The statute also allows for substitute property to be forfeited when the tainted property "cannot be located upon the exercise of due diligence,"
"has been placed beyond the jurisdiction of the court," "has been substantially diminished in value," or "has been commingled with other property which cannot be divided
without difficulty." 21 USC § 853(p)(1)(A), (C)-(E).
159 David J. Fried, Rationalizing Criminal Forfeiture, 79 J Crim L & Crimin 328,
406-10 (1988).
160 In fact, it may be the case that allowing the government to recover buy money so
easily decreases its incentives to avoid risking important taxpayer resources. The intuition is that the government will use more buy money than is actually necessary to
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Community restitution.

Finally, community restitution provides a route for judges to
ensure that defendants redress any harm they might have
caused to the community by accepting buy money. The MVRA
allows judges to order community restitution when a defendant
is convicted of a drug crime "in which there is no identifiable victim."161 This provision should apply to many buy-money
cases, as
buy money is often used to investigate traditionally "victimless"
crimes, such as drug trafficking.162 While community restitution
is optional under 18 USC § 3663(c), following the Sentencing
Guidelines would require it. The Guidelines state that the judge
"shall order an amount of community restitution" in certain categories of cases with no identifiable victim.163
The community restitution statute also reflects congressional judgments about how harm to the community should be compensated. The statute requires that restitution be set "based on
the amount of public harm caused by the offense."164 It further
directs that 65 percent of the restitution award should be paid to
the state for crime victim assistance and that 35 percent should
be directed to state agencies tasked with substance abuse prevention.16 It is unclear why courts do not impose community
restitution more often in cases involving buy money.1 66 It is pos-

sible, however, that prosecutors do not pursue community restitution because payments made into victim-compensation funds
do not benefit the federal government directly.
In sum, punitive fines, criminal forfeiture, and community
restitution work together to guarantee that any defendant who
has received buy money will be required to repay it (and often to
pay more). And they provide limited procedural protections to
ensure that the defendant is not subjected to LFOs contradictory

further an investigation or will keep very loose accounting. Courts' further failure to
scrutinize government allegations of buy-money expenditures would only exacerbate
these problems.
161 18 USC § 3663(c).
162 See, for example, United States v Leman, 574 Fed Appx 699, 701 (6th Cir 2014)
(affirming a restitution order of $1,000,000 under the community restitution provision
for a defendant who had been convicted of a conspiracy to distribute oxycodone and
methadone); United States v Lopez-Rosado, 224 Fed Appx 186, 187 (3d Cir 2007).
163 USSG § 5E1.1(d) (emphasis added).
164 18 USC § 3663(c)(2)(A).
165 18 USC § 3663(c)(3)(A)-(B).
166 I could not find any case involving buy money in which community restitution
was imposed.
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to Congress's judgment. Disallowing BMR as a condition of supervised release will help ensure that defendants receive the
limited protections afforded under these statutes and that the
proceeds from those LFOs go to the causes that Congress designates. It also better comports with a reality in which Congress
has provided the government with many comprehensive tools to
seize back its buy-money expenditures and other related costs.
C.

Internal Constraints: Restrictions on Discretionary
Conditions

In addition to the robust scheme of fines and fees described
above, the internal construction of the supervised release statute itself also categorically excludes BMR as a condition of supervised release. This Section untangles courts' interpretations
of the requirements built into the supervised release statute, establishing that the statute's requirements meaningfully limit
the categories of discretionary conditions courts may impose. It
then argues that LFOs, including BMR, will not usually meet
the statute's requirements. Finally, it distinguishes BMR from
other types of LFO conditions that are allowed under the supervised release statute.
Sixth Circuit Judge Nathaniel Jones prefigured this argument. In his concurrence in Gall, he responded to the Seventh
Circuit's conclusion in Daddato that BMR could be imposed not
as restitution but instead under the catchall provision.167 With-

out providing any detailed analysis of the sentencing purposes
in 18 USC § 3553(a)(2)(B)-(D) (respectively, general deterrence,
specific deterrence, and rehabilitation), Jones briefly argued
that BMR might not fulfill any of them.168 This Section more

thoroughly develops Jones's position.

167 Gall, 21 F3d at 113 (Jones concurring).
168 Jones noted that:
Ordering a criminal defendant, as a condition of supervised release, to repay
the government's buy money or other investigating costs, deprives the defendant of liberty during the period of supervised release, yet does not advance any
of these three purposes; such an order neither deters criminal conduct, nor
does it protect the public from further crimes, not does it provide any educational, vocational, medical, or correctional benefit to the defendant. Indeed,
such a deprivation of liberty during the supervised release period could actually encourage the defendant to commit further crimes as a means of repaying
such an onerous financial burden.
Id (Jones concurring).
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1. The statutory requirements placed on discretionary
conditions are substantive and binding.
While courts often use a case-specific approach to analyze
whether a condition of supervised release is appropriate under
the reasonable-relation requirement and deprivation-of-liberty
constraint,169 they also frequently establish categorical rules
against certain conditions. The circuits' willingness to impose
these rules illustrates that it is possible for a supervised release
condition to be categorically impermissible. For example, in
United States v Russell,170 the DC Circuit struck down a supervised release condition that set a thirty-year ban on the defendant's access to a computer because it "deprive[d] the defendant
of substantially more liberty than [] 'reasonably necessary for
the purposes set forth"' in

§ 3583(d)(1).171

Neither the character-

istics of the defendant nor the particulars of the crime had an
impact on that result. Similarly, the Eighth Circuit in United
States v Smith172 held that a condition requiring the defendant
not to father children with anyone other than his wife could not
possibly be reasonably related to any of the § 3583(d)(1) goals.173
Moreover, Congress itself has indicated that it is possible for
certain sanctions to be categorically incompatible with particular § 3553(a) goals. Under 18 USC § 3582(a), courts are required
to recognize that "imprisonment is not an appropriate means of
promoting correction and rehabilitation" when deciding whether
to impose a prison term as part of a sentence. 174 In Tapia v
United States,175 the Supreme Court interpreted that requirement to preclude trial courts from sentencing defendants to
prison for rehabilitative reasons. 176 In Tapia, the sentencing
court had lengthened the defendant's prison term for the sole
purpose of making her eligible for a rehabilitative treatment
program. 177 The Court relied on legislative history and the plain
meaning of the statute to conclude that it prohibited imposing a
prison term for the reason the court had given.178 The result in
169

See Part I.A.

170 600 F3d 631 (DC Cir 2010).
171 Id at 637, citing 18 USC § 3583(d)(2).
172 972 F2d 960 (8th Cir 1992).
173

Id at 962.

174 18

USC § 3582(a).

175 564 US 319 (2011).
176 Id at 332.
177

Id at 334.

178 Id at 325-34.
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Tapia indicates that Congress is willing to find certain criminal
sanctions categorically incompatible with particular sentencing
goals.
One might argue that Congress could have made a similarly
explicit judgment about the incompatibility of BMR and any of
the § 3553(a) goals when it drafted the supervised release statute. After all, Congress's clarity in declaring incarceration incompatible with rehabilitation indicates that it knew how to explicitly and categorically find a sanction incompatible with a
purpose of sentencing. It is more likely, however, that lawmakers simply did not think to do so in the case of BMR. It would be
impossible for Congress to think of (and spell out the sentencing
relevance of) every possible discretionary condition a judge
might impose. I found no evidence that Congress has ever considered the issue of buy money; nor could Congress have anticipated that prosecutors or district-court judges would allow BMR
as a condition of supervised release given the courts' narrow
construction of the VWPA as described above in Part I.C. Indeed, instead of attempting to foresee every discretionary condition courts might impose, Congress constrained the universe of
possible conditions by requiring the sentencing courts themselves to evaluate those conditions against the purposes of
sentencing.
Not all possible conditions of supervised release actually
meet the reasonable-relation requirement and deprivation-ofliberty constraint. While empirical research has not examined
the effects of BMR on rehabilitation, specific deterrence, or general deterrence, there are myriad studies of the effects of other
LFOs on those goals. A typical account describes LFOs as
"debt[s] arising from a ... court order to pay money in connection with a criminal case," including "restitution, fines, fees, and
costs."179 BMR, which is a financial obligation imposed by sen-

tencing courts, is an LFO. It is therefore possible to draw conclusions about the effectiveness of BMR with respect to the relevant sentencing goals from the extensive research that has been
conducted on the effects of other LFOs.
As Part III.B.2 explains, LFOs generally undermine the
specific-deterrence and rehabilitation goals. The claim that they
provide general deterrence, while stronger, is also relatively weak

179 Michael L. Vander Giessen, Note, Legislative Reforms for Washington State's
CriminalMonetary Penalties, 47 Gonzaga L Rev 547, 548 (2012).
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in comparison with other possible sanctions. As an LFO, BMR is
likely to have many of the same issues, and as such its compliance with the sentencing goals should be carefully scrutinized.
2. Monetary conditions of supervised release undercut the
goals of rehabilitation and specific deterrence.
The imposition of LFOs does not further the goal of rehabilitation. 18 USC § 3553(a)(2)(D) requires that a condition of supervised release help "provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional
treatment in the most effective manner."180 Requiring a defendant to pay money to the government is clearly unrelated to those
services. Even an LFO requiring that a defendant pay for such
rehabilitative services as vocational training or medical care
would not help an individual defendant access those services,
assuming they were otherwise available. Instead, it would act as
an added barrier given that the defendant would have to come
up with the resources to comply in the first place.
Along those lines, it is possible that LFOs can actually frustrate the goal of rehabilitation. First, empirical research indicates that LFOs make rehabilitation more difficult for defendants. In general, LFOs "exacerbate poverty by reducing
available income and limiting access to employment, credit,
transportation, and housing."181 LFOs' "rehabilitation-defeating
propensities"182 result from their regressive effects, which push
already impoverished families further into poverty. In their article, Professor Alexes Harris, Heather Evans, and Professor
Katherine Beckett argue that "legal debt is [often] substantial
relative to expected earnings" and that it "contributes to . . . disadvantage ... by reducing family income [and] limiting access to
opportunities and resources."183 LFOs' effects on income thus
create greater barriers to the kinds of products and services

180 18 USC § 3553(a)(2)(D).
181 Vander Giessen, Note, 47 Gonzaga L Rev at 552-53 (cited in note 179).
182 Kevin R. Reitz, The Economic Rehabilitation of Offenders: Recommendations of
the Model Penal Code (Second), 99 Minn L Rev 1735, 1743 (2015).
183 Alexes Harris, Heather Evans, and Katherine Beckett, Drawing Blood from
Stones: Legal Debt and Social Inequality in the Contemporary United States, 115 Am J
Sociology 1753, 1756 (2010). See also Katherine Beckett and Alexes Harris, On Cash and
Conviction: Monetary Sanctions as Misguided Policy, 10 Crimin & Pub Pol 509, 514-15
(2011). For an extended treatment of the subject, see generally Note, Developments in the
Law: Policing, 128 Harv L Rev 1706 (2015).
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that former criminal defendants need to readjust to life in the
community.
Similarly, LFOs undercut the goal of specific deterrence.
Section 3553(a)(2)(C) requires that any condition of supervised
release "protect the public from further crimes of the defendant."184 It is conceivable, of course, that imposing LFOs (or, specifically, requiring a defendant to pay BMR) in one case might
make her less likely to commit similar crimes in the future.
There is research that points the other way, however. For example, reduced income-combined with more difficult access to
credit and employment-can increase a defendant's incentives to
seek alternate sources of income in the illicit economy. 185 Some
scholars argue that LFOs can further specific deterrence by encouraging released defendants to remain employed and avoid increasing their criminal justice debt.186 However, the evidence
that LFOs have that effect in practice is quite weak.187
Finally, it is possible that monetary conditions of supervised
release further the general-deterrence goal.188 However, a weak
link to general deterrence cannot justify imposing an LFO under
the reasonable-relation requirement and deprivation-of-liberty
constraint. LFOs in general-and BMR specifically-may not
undermine general deterrence in the same way that they undermine specific deterrence and rehabilitation. But the
reasonable-relation requirement189 calls for BMR to actually further general deterrence in some way. Absent evidence to the
contrary, there is no plausible reason to believe that LFOs create better deterrent effects than other possible criminal sanctions like incarceration or community service. Especially given
that the supervised release statute also imposes the deprivationof-liberty constraint,190 a conceivable general deterrent effect
does not justify imposing an LFO. If it did, virtually any condition that placed some limit on the defendant would qualify, and
the requirements of 18 USC § 3583(d)(1)-(2) would hold no

§ 3553(a)(2)(C).
Reitz, 99 Minn L Rev at 1743-45 (cited in note 182).
186 Id at 1742.
187 Id at 1743-44 ("Unrealistic or heavy financial obligations interfere with offenders' abilities to obtain credit, pay for transportation (often essential to employment), pursue educational opportunities, and sustain family ties.").
188 18 USC § 3553(a)(2)(B) (setting out the goal of "afford[ing] adequate deterrence
to criminal conduct").
189 18 USC § 3583(d)(1).
190 18 USC § 3583(d)(2).
184 18 USC
185
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weight at all. Such a result would not only be absurd but would
also be contrary to courts' general willingness to strike down
conditions under those provisions as described in Part L.A and
Part III.B.1.
3. Buy-money repayment is distinguishable from other
LFOs that Congress explicitly allows as conditions of
supervised release.
There are, of course, three expressly provided discretionary
conditions of supervised release that qualify as LFOs. They are
all distinguishable from BMR in terms of their possible deterrent or rehabilitative effects, however. First, a defendant can be
required to "support his dependents and meet other family responsibilities"191 ("dependent-support condition"). Second, as discussed above, a defendant may be required to "make restitution
to a victim of the offense"192 ("restitution condition"). Finally, the
defendant may be required to "comply with the terms of any
court order ...

requiring payments by the defendant for the

support and maintenance of a child or of a child and the parent
with whom the child is living"193 ("child-support-andmaintenance condition").
Because Congress made these conditions available under
the supervised release statute, it is likely that lawmakers
thought the conditions would comport with the reasonablerelation requirement and deprivation-of-liberty constraint in at
least some cases. Congress did not, however, elect to require
these conditions in all cases. And in the case of victim restitution, that choice seems to have been intentional. That is, while
the probation statute-from which the discretionary conditions
of supervised release were lifted almost wholesale194-actually
requires that all defendants make restitution as applicable under the VWPA or MVRA,195 the supervised release statute does
not. Instead, it leaves the imposition of victim restitution entirely up to the discretion of the judge.196 The fact that Congress

191 18 USC

§ 3563(b)(1).

18 USC § 3563(b)(2).
193 18 USC § 3563(b)(20).
194 See 18 USC § 3563.
195 18 USC § 3563(a)(6)(A).
192

196 Congress, in other words, did not require restitution in all cases of supervised
release. This decision was likely due to the fact that restitution as a monetary condition
has some punitive aspects that are a better fit with probation (which, as a substitute for
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chose not to require these conditions in every case indicates that
it knew they might not always fulfill the requirements of the supervised release statute.
Each of the three discretionary LFO conditions, however,
has a better claim to fulfilling the supervised release goals than
BMR. Although all LFOs may undercut specific deterrence and
rehabilitation as described above,197 the three financial conditions expressly provided in the statute may have benefits for
certain defendants that BMR does not.
The dependent-support condition and child-support-andmaintenance condition may further the goal of rehabilitation.
Both conditions require the defendant to support her family
members, and in doing so to take responsibility for normal life
expenses and burdens. The conditions may ease the defendant's
transition back into the community by alerting her to and preparing her for the financial obligations she will have there and
ensuring that she fulfills them. They might also help to improve
the defendant's family relationships to the extent she would not
have fulfilled her responsibilities without this additional legal
incentive. Cooperative family relationships, in turn, might provide the defendant with more support as she transitions back to
the community.
The restitution condition may also have positive implications for the sentencing goals. Specifically, restitution may help
the defendant better understand the harm she has caused her
victim-a mechanism that may further both rehabilitation and
specific deterrence. The rehabilitative effect of restitution comes
from its particular ability to focus the defendant on the exact
kind and amount of harm she has caused198 and put a face on the
victim.199 Forcing the defendant to acknowledge and recognize
her victim and then actually repair some of the harm may also
incarceration, is intended to be punitive) than with supervised release (which is intended
to be imposed in addition to a punitive sanction like incarceration, not instead of one).
197 See Part III.B.2.
198 Note, Victim Restitution in the Criminal Process:A ProceduralAnalysis, 97 Harv
L Rev 931, 938 (1984) ("[B]y ordering restitution, a court forces the defendant to
acknowledge in concrete terms the harm he has caused.").
199 Id. Interestingly, this student note also argues that restitution can be more beneficial than fines or imprisonment for specific deterrence because it "more directly corresponds to the loss the offender has caused." Id at 939. For further support of the general
rehabilitative theory, see Kenneth Winchester Gaines, The Newly Adopted CriminalRestitution Statutes of South Carolina:Analysis and Recommendations for Change, 46 SC L
Rev 289, 331 (1995). For examples of older articles espousing some version of this argument, see note 201.
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"enable[] [her] to achieve a sense of accomplishment which
further promotes [her] reform."200 And while the actual rehabilitative effects of victim restitution are almost impossible to
measure, it is clear that Congress could reasonably have relied
on these types of rehabilitative theories in choosing to allow the
restitution condition.201 In terms of specific deterrence, a study
conducted by Professors Maureen Outlaw and R. Barry Ruback
found that restitution payments may actually be linked to lower
rates of re-arrest. 202 Outlaw and Ruback, as well as previous researchers,203 posit that restitution is most effective in preventing
recidivism when it helps defendants understand the harm they
have caused for their victims. Their argument is similar to the
arguments about rehabilitation above: "[R]estitution may be effective because it emphasizes the benefits to the victim and allows offenders to take responsibility for their actions without
stigmatizing them."204

BMR is unlike the discretionary conditions expressly included in the supervised release statute in that it does not have
any cognizable rehabilitative effects. It differs from the restitution condition in that it does not focus the defendant on the
harm to her victim, and it differs from the dependent-support
and child-support-and-maintenance conditions in that it
200 Stan Siegel, Crime and Punishment: The Proprietyand Effect of South Dakota's
Victim Restitution Legislation, 31 SD L Rev 783, 788 (1986).
201 Scholarship linking restitution and rehabilitation predates the passage
of the
Sentencing Reform Act in 1984. See, for example, James L. Bonta, et al, Restitution in
CorrectionalHalf-Way Houses: Victim Satisfaction, Attitudes, and Recidivism, 25 Canadian J Crimin 277, 290-91 (1983) (finding a correlation between the amount an offender
repaid and his success in a rehabilitation program); James William Casson III, Restitution: An Economically and Socially DesirableApproach to Sentencing, 9 New Eng J Crim
& Civ Confinement 349, 354 (1983) ("[R]estitution, while restoring the victim, is also
therapeutic and aids in the rehabilitation of the criminal."); David Shichor and Arnold
Binder, Community Restitution for Juveniles: An Approach and PreliminaryEvaluation,
7 Crim Just Rev 46, 48 (1982) (finding, in a small sample, a link between participation in
a restitution program and lower rates of recidivism); Charles W. Colson and Daniel H.
Benson, Restitution as an Alternative to Imprisonment, Det Coll L Rev 523, 527 (1980)
("We are persuaded that if restitution is adopted in the United States as a primary postconviction response to criminal behavior, there will be significantly greater rehabilitation of offenders.").
202 Maureen C. Outlaw and R. Barry Ruback, Predictors and Outcomes of Victim
Restitution Orders, 16 Just Q 847, 849-50 (1999) (finding lower rates of re-arrest for defendants ordered to pay restitution).
203 See generally Laurie Ervin and Anne Schneider, Explaining the Effects of Restitution on Offenders: Results from a National Experiment in Juvenile Courts, in Burt
Galaway and Joe Hudson, eds, Criminal Justice, Restitution, and Reconciliation 183
(Willow Tree 1990).
204 Outlaw and Ruback, 16 Just Q at 851 (cited in note 202).
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cannot help ease the defendant back into her regular duties
and obligations.
First, BMR does not provide the same opportunity to understand the harm to the victim that is crucial to the restitution
condition's rehabilitation and specific-deterrence effects. While
BMR could conceivably be ordered in cases in which there are
victims, BMR itself does not involve payments to victims and as
such does not help defendants empathize with particular people
harmed.205 Additionally, while victim restitution can help a defendant understand the amount of harm she has caused (in addition to identifying the individuals whom she has harmed),206
the amount of repayment in the buy-money context is entirely
arbitrary-it depends on the amount that the government decided to expend in the investigation. Unlike victim restitution,
which attempts to reimburse losses as exactly as possible, BMR
does not purport to reflect the quality or quantity of harm the
defendant has inflicted on the community. It simply involves reimbursing the government for an investigative expense. And in
any case, judges already have a tool for ordering restitution in
situations with no identifiable individual victim but in which the
court determines that some harm has been done to the community: the community restitution statute described above in
Part III.A.3.
Second, BMR does not have the same rehabilitative effects
as the dependent-support and child-support-and-maintenance
conditions-helping to ease the defendant back into her regular
duties and obligations-and for that reason is not related to the
rehabilitation goal in the same way. BMR does not provide any
sort of compensation for community members or other individuals who might feel threatened or harmed by the defendant, or
who might need her support. And BMR is not a responsibility
that the defendant will automatically or inevitably have upon
release-it provides no training for "real life."

Because LFOs generally tend to undercut the relevant sentencing goals, specific LFOs should not be permitted as conditions of supervised release unless they are unusually well suited
to further those goals. BMR is unique in that it has all of the
205 See Part
206

I.C.

See Note, 97 Harv L Rev at 938 (cited in note 198).
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drawbacks of the LFOs expressly permitted by the supervised
release statute without any of the possible rehabilitation or
specific-deterrence benefits that those LFOs might provide. And
given that it is an LFO, BMR is likely to have effects that counteract those sentencing purposes entirely. Because Congress requires each condition of supervised release to further the goals
of the supervised release statute independently, BMR-which
does not further those goals-should not be imposed under it.
CONCLUSION

The circuit courts' disagreement regarding whether BMR is
a permissible condition of supervised release currently focuses
primarily on whether BMR should be considered restitution. The
Third and Sixth Circuits insist that it is restitution, while the
Seventh Circuit allows the condition in large part because it is
not restitution. As a result, no circuit court has engaged in a
comprehensive analysis of whether BMR could be imposed under the catchall provision, assuming that it is not restitution.
In fact, BMR likely is not restitution because it does not involve payments to crime victims. However, there are two primary reasons that it is also impermissible under the catchall.
First, BMR as a condition of supervised release is precluded by a
broad and robust statutory scheme of criminal LFOs. Punitive
fines, criminal forfeiture, and community restitution already
guarantee that defendants will be obliged to repay buy money.
Imposing buy money as a condition of supervised release in this
statutory context thus creates two major problems. First, the
government will be able to end-run Congress's procedural protections for defendants. And second, courts will effectively disregard Congress's judgments about where the proceeds of criminal
LFOs should end up.
Second, BMR does not meet the supervised release statute's
requirements for discretionary conditions. The statute requires
that supervised release conditions be "reasonably related" to the
§ 3553(a) sentencing purposes 207 and that they not be excessively
broad even if they fulfill those goals.208 LFOs in general, however, are unlikely to further the goals of deterrence or rehabilitation. In fact, they may undermine those goals by making it
more difficult for defendants to transition back into the
207
208

18 USC
18 USC

§ 3583(d)(1).
§ 3583(d)(2).
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community. While some LFO conditions are already expressly
permitted by the supervised release statute, those conditions
have rehabilitation and specific-deterrence purposes that may
justify their use as discretionary conditions. BMR, however, does
not have the same positive effects.
Taken together, the external and internal constraints on
discretionary supervised release conditions create a strong legal
argument against imposing BMR as a condition of supervised
release. BMR conflicts directly with a comprehensive statutory
scheme of criminal LFOs, and it violates the requirements for
discretionary conditions expressly written into the supervised
release statute itself.

